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Will a group of people reach a collective target through individual
contributions when everyone suffers individually if the target is
missed? This ‘‘collective-risk social dilemma’’ exists in various social
scenarios, the globally most challenging one being the prevention of
dangerous climate change. Reaching the collective target requires
individual sacrifice, with benefits to all but no guarantee that others
will also contribute. It even seems tempting to contribute less and
save money to induce others to contribute more, hence the dilemma
and the risk of failure. Here, we introduce the collective-risk social
dilemma and simulate it in a controlled experiment: Will a group of
people reach a fixed target sum through successive monetary con-
tributions, when they know they will lose all their remaining money
with a certain probability if they fail to reach the target sum? We find
that, under high risk of simulated dangerous climate change, half of
the groups succeed in reaching the target sum, whereas the others
only marginally fail. When the risk of loss is only as high as the
necessary average investment or even lower, the groups generally
fail to reach the target sum. We conclude that one possible strategy
to relieve the collective-risk dilemma in high-risk situations is to
convince people that failure to invest enough is very likely to cause
grave financial loss to the individual. Our analysis describes the social
window humankind has to prevent dangerous climate change.
cooperation  public good  threshold
Whenever people have to maintain a public resource, such asavoiding overfishing the oceans or protecting the global
climate, they find themselves in a social dilemma, which has been
called ‘‘the tragedy of the commons’’ (1). It is well known that over
six billion ‘‘players’’ take part in a global climate tragedy of the
commons, ‘‘a game that we cannot afford to lose’’ (2). However,
humankind faces a dramatic change of living conditions on Earth
when the already-rising global temperature passes a certain thresh-
old: Dangerous climate change will occur (3–6). To reduce the risk
of dangerous climate change, global greenhouse gas emissions
should be reduced to 50% of the present level by 2050 (7). A
reduction of this magnitude is beyond the capability of any single
country and requires international cooperation. Herein lies a
dilemma: substantial emissions reductions are likely to have neg-
ative short-term economic effects, but failure to accomplish this
reduction may well incur dangerous climate change later, resulting
in substantial human, ecological, and economic losses (5). Thus, a
special type of social dilemma has to be solved, which we call the
collective-risk social dilemma. Will a group of people reach a
collective target through individual contributions when everybody
would suffer if the group fails to achieve the target?
The collective-risk social dilemma has characteristic features
that, taken together, distinguish it from other social dilemmas: (i)
people have to make decisions repeatedly before the outcome is
evident, (ii) investments are lost (i.e., no refunds), (iii) the effective
value of the public good (in this case, the prevention of dangerous
climate change) is unknown, and (iv) the remaining private good is
at stake with a certain probability if the target sum is not collected.
Threshold public goods games have been studied intensely theo-
retically (8, 9) and experimentally (refs. 10–15; see ref. 16 for a
review). Of the above-mentioned characteristics, several studies
investigated the exclusion of refunding (see table 1 in ref. 16), and
one study tested the effect of limited information about the value
of the public good and its distribution (17). However, these eco-
nomically focused studies are designed to simulate not a dilemma
similar to the climate problem but rather the funding for bridges,
public roads, railway lines (14), or a new coffee pot for a community
office (8). In contrast to these examples, the climate game involves
investing in a public good, not to realize a gain but to avoid a loss.
Thus, we expect the strategies adopted in the climate game to be
risk-averse. Furthermore, many public goods games focus on a
conflict between individual and group interests, but a major com-
ponent of the climate problem is also a conflict between short- and
long-term interests. Therefore, we propose the collective-risk social
dilemma as a framework to investigate the inherent problems of
avoiding dangerous climate change and other problems of this type.
The ability of people to assemble a target common good, such as
food reserves, or to build up a collective defense system, i.e., a fence
or a trench,might have been important at a timewhen humans lived
in small communities that had to survive the winter or to defend
their village. The building of an emergency sandbag levee by
neighbors to protect their community from a flood has been
important over the centuries. Half a fence or sand bag levee is
hardly better than none. When there is no attack or high flood, the
investment is lost. If the fence or sandbag levee is not complete and
an attack or high flood occurs, all private goods are at stake. Many
similar scenarios exist. Thus, there might exist a rich toolbox of
social strategies of testing, signaling, or encouraging motivation to
help collect a target common good in a collective-risk social
dilemma. Nevertheless, the collective-risk social dilemma has not
yet been analyzed by evolutionary theory. Our approach is exper-
imental and might be an incentive for theoretical modeling.
In our simulation of the collective-risk social dilemma, every
subject faces the same tradeoff: The more he or she invests in the
collective good, the higher the probability that the group reaches
the target sum, but the less money remains in his or her personal
account, which he or she is guaranteed to receive in cash after
the session if the target sum has been reached. In contrast, failure
to reach the target sum implies a risk that the remaining money
in the personal account will be lost. The social dilemma of this
scenario adds another tradeoff: The more others invest, the less
a subject needs to invest for the group still to reach its target sum.
In this simulation, we interpret not reaching the target sum as
failing to prevent dangerous climate change. Would others
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compensate, that is, pay more than their fair share, if someone
invested nothing or less than his or her fair share per round?
Subjects were anonymous in the experiment, but all subjects
could see howmuch money other subjects contributed after each
round. Decisions from the same person could be recognized as
such: Altruists, fair sharers, and free riders would become
recognizable during the experiment, as well as subjects that
change their strategy. Clearly, our groups of six subjects cannot
represent all players of the climate game who individually decide
how to travel, use fossil fuel, etc. If we find that all groups of six
subjects collect the target sum, we cannot conclude anything for
the climate game. However, if some of our small experimental
groups fail to collect the target, larger groups would certainly fail
with higher probability, and other solutions of the climate
problems would have to be found.
Thirty groups of six students each took part in a public goods
game (18) modified to simulate the collective-risk social dilemma
via an interactive computer program. We provided the students
with an endowment of €40 each, and the students knew they would
be asked in each of 10 rounds to invest anonymously €0, €2, or €4
in a ‘‘climate account.’’ They knew that, if the total contributions of
the group reached or surpassed €120 at the end of the 10 rounds
(equivalent to €2 per person per round on average), all group
members would receive what they had not invested in climate
change mitigation strategies in cash (for example, €20 if a person
had invested €2 per round). If the group failed to reach this
collective goal, the computer ‘‘threwdice,’’ so that with a probability
of 90% all groupmembers would lose all their savings. In two other
treatments, also with 10 groups of six students each, this probability
was 50% and 10%, respectively (see Methods). With these treat-
ments, failure to reach the target sum is still interpreted as
analogous to incurring dangerous climate change but with a much-
reduced risk of affecting individuals.
Independent of the treatment, groups who exactly reached the
target sum collected, on average, €20 per player; the players then,
on average, had invested their fair share. To maximize income, the
best possible strategy would thus be to collect the target sum when
failure would result in complete loss of money with a probability of
90%: If no one invests anything, any subject would receive his or her
saved €40 only in one of 10 cases, that is, €4 on average (Table 1).
This is much less than if the fair personal share is invested and the
average €20 would be gained after the session. The groups taking
part in the 50% treatment, on average, would gain €20 per person,
either by investing the fair share and safely collecting €20 each or
by investing nothing and on average gaining €20, that is, €40 in half
of the cases. Groups in the 10% treatment on average gained most
from investing nothing: If no one invested anything, any subject
would receive €36 on average, because he or she would lose the
saved €40 only in one of 10 cases (Table 1).
In the 90% treatment, each course of the game that leads to
exactly reaching the target sum of €120, irrespective of who
contributes howmuch as long as each player invests less than €36,
is a Nash equilibrium: No single player can gain by deviating
from his or her strategy (19–21). Once a single subject irratio-
nally switches either to a strategy that jeopardizes reaching the
target sum or that may exceed the target sum (both of which
lowers his or her expected earnings), the remaining subjects’ best
strategies also involve a switch [Table 1; a description of equi-
librium points and rational decisions is available as supporting
information (SI) Appendix]. Depending on the current public
sum and stage in the game, this switch might be either to ‘‘cut
their losses’’ and also become free riders or to ‘‘maintain their
investment’’ and increase the level of altruism. The latter is
expected when one knows that the target might be missed
because of some free riders; one invests more to secure some
money. This represents a ‘‘snow drift game’’ scenario (22), where
the best strategy is to cooperate when you know your partner will
defect. Irrational responses such as the first switch stated above
(that is, those that lower personal expectations) have been
reported in several other game designs (e.g., ref. 23). These
responses appear to be related to a sense of fairness, that is,
situations that are perceived as unfair often result in players
making less than optimal choices. In addition to purely self-
interested people, there appears to be a fraction of people who
are also motivated by these fairness considerations (24). One
explanation for this behavior is that humans are better adapted
to repeated game situations where fairness can become adaptive
(e.g., ref. 25). A lot of opportunity exists in this climate protec-
tion game for unfair choices to be made, that is, free rider
strategies can be adopted requiring other subjects to choose
altruist strategies for the group still to reach the target sum (see
SI Appendix), which, because of human behavior, jeopardizes the
goal of preventing dangerous climate change.
Results and Discussion
Despite the difficulties outlined above, we found that 5 of the 10
groups in the 90% treatment successfully collected the target sum.
This is significantly different (n  10, P  0.0001, binomial test)
from the rational outcome of all groups reaching the target. Only
one group in the 50% treatment and, as expected, none of the
groups in the 10% treatment achieved the collective goal of
preventing simulated dangerous climate change (Fig. 1). Surpris-
ingly, almost all groups provided €2 per person in the first round,
an all fair-sharer situation. However, in subsequent rounds, some
subjects supplied nothing, which others clearly noticed, as stated in
a questionnaire after the game; probably as a consequence, the
Fig. 1. Groups that either reach the target or fail. Displayed is the percentage
of groups of six subjects each that fail to invest the target sum of at least€120
during 10 climate rounds, when they have a probability of 90%, 50%, or 10%
of losing all their savings if the target sum is not reached. There are differences
in not reaching the target among treatments (P0.008,n30,df2,29,2
9.66). The percentage of groups not reaching the target is significantly dif-
ferent from all groups reaching the target in each treatment (in each case:n
10, P  0.0001, binomial test).
Table 1. The expected account values at the end of the game
under three pure strategies (all players share the same strategy
for the entire game)
Loss probability, % Free rider, € Fair sharer, € Altruist, €
90 4 20 0
50 20 20 0
10 36 20 0
Free riders contribute€0 each round, fair sharers€2, and altruists€4. At a
90% probability of account loss, the optimal strategy is to contribute€2 each
round to the collective. At a 10% probability of loss, the Free Rider strategy is
rational, and at 50%, both of these strategies provide identical expected
earnings.
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motivation to contribute declined steadily. This was particularly
noticeable for the 50% and 10% treatments, where many subjects
reduced investments after round six. Providing €118.2  1.9
(mean  SE), the groups in the 90% treatment just failed on
average to reach the target sumof €120 (Fig. 2). The five groups that
did not reach the target sum collected on average (€112.8  1.2).
Just failing to reach the target represents the worst possible
outcome: low individual savings and no collective benefit. The
groups involved in the 50% and 10% treatments missed the target
sum by far with €92.2 9.0 and 73.0 4.4, respectively (difference
among the three treatments: P  0.0001, n  30, df  2.29, F 
13.784). However, even the groups in the 10% treatment did not try
to gain most on average by investing nothing (Fig. 2); against the
rational strategy, they collected 50% of the target sum. This
irrational behavior may indicate a high potential motivation also to
protect the real climate and suggests future experiments where
responses to othermotivation factors could be studied. Perhaps this
surprising behavior also stems from strong risk aversion, which has
been shown to result in departures from standardNash-equilibrium
predictions (e.g., ref. 26). Some free riders did invest nothing and
in 8 of 10 groups won their big savings. Group members invested
differently in the climate account. Of the six members of each
group, there were 3.3  1.3, 2.1  0.6, and only 1.1  0.3 subjects
in the 90%, 50%, and 10% treatments, respectively (P 0.003, n
30, df  2.29, F  7.137), that provided at least their fair share of
€2 per round. The rest were free riders; the extreme free rider per
group provided only €1.4 0.1, 0.9 0.2, and 0.5 0.2 per round
in the 90%, 50%, and 10% treatments, respectively (P 0.0003, n
30, df  2,29, F  11.137).
Interestingly, the dynamics of selfish acts (providing €0),
fair-share acts (providing €2), and altruistic acts (providing €4)
differed among and within treatments (Fig. 3). In the 90%
treatment, selfish acts decreased from the first to the second half
of the session (P  0.023, z  2.739, paired t test, two-tailed), as
did fair-share acts (P  0.038, z  2.433), but altruistic acts
strongly increased during the session (P  0.0001, z  6.325).
This is mirrored by the slightly U-shaped curve describing the
cumulative approach of the target sum: It is almost reached after
round 10 on average (Fig. 2). This shift of strategies during the
90% treatment also illustrates the importance of short-term, in
contrast to long-term, interests in individual strategy decisions
during game play. Conversely, in the 50% treatment, selfish acts
increased (P  0.011, z  3.188), but fair-share acts strongly
decreased (P  0.0006, z  5.161), and altruistic acts slightly
increased (P 0.035, z2.473) (Fig. 3). In the 50% treatment,
altruists obviously tried to compensate free riding of others, but
usually in vain. In the 10% treatment, selfish acts increased from
the first to the second half of the session; from an already high
level (P  0.011, z  3.196), fair-share acts decreased (P 
0.001, z  4.776), and altruistic acts were maintained at a low
level (P  0.8, z  0.259).
In the 90% treatment, failure to achieve the target sum some-
times occurred in an extremely irrational way. Occasionally in the
last round, it became clear that all of the contributions to the
cumulative sum would have been in vain unless a large proportion
of the players made a maximal contribution. Nevertheless, an
insufficient number of players made this contribution, and the
group just failed to reach the target sum (see also SI Appendix). Not
Fig. 2. Cumulative sum of money per group and round provided for the
climate account. The target sum to be achieved after 10 rounds was€120; the
treatments differed in the probability, i.e., 90%, 50%, and 10%, with which all
subjects in a group lost their individual savings when the group did not supply
the target sum for the climate account.
Fig. 3. Strategic behavior of subjects depending on the risk of losing all
savings. Number of selfish acts, i.e., providing€0 (unfilled columns); fair-share
acts, i.e., providing €2 (light-gray shading); and altruistic acts, i.e., providing
€4 (dark-gray shading), per group of six subjects in the first (rounds 1–5, left
in column pair) and second halves (rounds 6–10, right in column pair). The
probability of losing all savings if the target sum is not reached was 90%, 50%,
or 10%, for a, b, and c, respectively. See text for statistics.























contributing more at the end of the game, despite the risk of
personal loss, may stem from a reluctance to reward behavior that
is perceived as unfair.
When the risk of loss was no higher than the necessary average
investment, our experimental groups generally failed to reach
the target sum, which represented a threshold for preventing
dangerous climate change. In contrast, groups with a high
probability (90%) of losing their savings either succeeded in
preventing simulated dangerous climate change or, half the time,
came close to preventing it. Groups of six subjects may not
represent the real climate game; our findings probably underrate
the problems of the global challenge, because achieving coop-
eration is more difficult for larger than for smaller groups (27).
Nevertheless, a proportion of the target could be achieved even
in larger groups.
However, the number of countries with political representa-
tives at climate summits or G8 summits is small compared with
all individual players in the game. Perhaps our experimental
setup may best be interpreted as representing such summits, with
their smaller group size. Furthermore, in contrast to our exper-
iments, climate or G8 summits are not anonymous, and it has
been shown that anonymity is a strong impediment to preserving
a common good (28). Despite its conceptual simplicity, our
climate game thus holds promise for representing the social
dilemma inherent in preventing dangerous climate change.
The strict cutoff of €120 for any common benefit to be realized
may not be realistic for some hazards of climate change. However,
many elements of climate change have ‘‘threshold’’ properties,
consistent with our game design; adaptation to these abrupt
changes is expected to be particularly difficult (6). Unlike in our
game, real climate change, which is already underway, will not affect
everyone equally; some countries and regions might even profit
from it (5). However, this is different when dangerous climate
change occurs, which is expected to cause such disruption that in a
globalized world, no one would remain unaffected by it (3–5).
The collective-risk social dilemma seems to be a frequent phe-
nomenon of human social life. Preventing dangerous climate
change is but one example, albeit important, of this type of social
dilemma. We therefore tried to simulate the inherent problems of
preventing dangerous climate change in the present experiment.
There are three conclusions from our experiment: (i) To achieve an
effective level of voluntary individual cooperation, people have to
be convinced of the very high probability that individuals will be
affected by dangerous climate change, should the set target for the
reduction of global greenhouse gas emissions not be met by the set
date (here, 50% of the present level by 2050) (3, 7). If they believe
in a lower probability, climate protection may fail, as it did in our
50% and 10% treatments. The high motivation to invest in the
collective good that we found even in the 10% treatment suggests
that informing people is worth the effort. (ii) We cannot rely on
people to always behave rationally (23) (see also SI Appendix).
Climate protection programs that appeal to a human sense of
fairness (24), that is, all players contribute a ‘‘fair share’’ to the
collective goal, are more likely to avoid irrational self-detrimental
behavior. (iii) Because even our small experimental groups had
difficulty preventing simulated dangerous climate change, themany
players in the global game will certainly have more problems and
may fail to prevent dangerous climate change. Climate or G8
summits may well have increased probability of success because of
their smaller groups sizes. Also, incentives for investing in climate
protection, other than the fear of suffering from dangerous climate
change in the future, need to be offered, such as improved social
reputation with its inherent benefits (28) or a combination of
reputation and sanction institutions (29). Otherwise, the short-term
advantages of free riding may fulfill Hardin’s (1) prediction that
‘‘freedom in the commons brings ruin to all.’’
Methods
We tested 180 undergraduates who participated in 30 groups of six subjects
each in a computerized experiment (e.g., refs. 28 and 29) at the University of
Cologne and the University of Bonn. Our goal was to see whether they would
contribute their own money, which they had received as the initial endow-
ment, to prevent simulated dangerous climate change in a collective-risk
social dilemma. The subjects knew they would obtain their money after the
game in a way that did not disclose their identity. They were separated by
opaque partitions and each had a laptop computer, on which they received
the instructions for the experiment and with which they communicated their
decisions to invest €0, €2, or €4 in the ‘‘climate account’’ to the main
computer. After each of 10 rounds, the decisions of the six subjects were
displayed on all computers simultaneously without any clue to a subject’s
identity. However, each subject’s decision was listed in the same position after
each round to allow individual strategies to be observed; thus, individual
players were not anonymous within the game. Yet, they could not build a
reputation from which to profit in another situation (e.g., ref. 28). Note that
the cumulative sum of contributions was not displayed on the computer
screen. Instead, the students were given pen and paper, and they were
encouraged to take notes during the game.
The students knew that the total sum of money in the climate account,
accumulated from all groups, would be used to publish a press advertisement
on climate protection in a daily German newspaper simultaneously with the
publication of the present study. However, they received the ‘‘little informa-
tion’’ version from ref. 28 to explain the climate account, so that we could
expect very weak motivation to invest in publishing the advertisement per se.
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